Warsaw, 6 February 2026
Waldemar Gontarski
The Defendant’s Position on the Barbarisation of the Proceedings in the Regional Court in Katowice — documenting an allegation of a breach of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention
XVI K 225/25
Regional Court in Katowice,
16th Criminal Division,
40‑061 Katowice, ul. Andrzeja 16/18
The Defendant’s Position on the Barbarisation of the Proceedings in the Regional Court in Katowice
The Regional Court in Katowice, in the proceedings conducted against me, is not applying the law, because, instead of subsumption, it continues an attempt to effect my biological annihilation, which has lasted uninterruptedly since the initiation of the investigation. I have demonstrated this attempted annihilation, for example:
- in a press interview given from the Prison in Rzeszów (Annex No. 1 to this position paper: Interview for the weekly „Angora” of 15 December 2024); when issuing, on 16 May 2025, an order in case III Kp 23/25, setting aside the order of the Prosecutor of the District Prosecutor’s Office in Tarnów refusing to institute an investigation on my denunciations, the Regional Court in Rzeszów indicated among the acts to be taken, inter alia, „obtaining the text from the weekly 'Angora'”;
- in procedural writings served first on the Regional Court in Warsaw, where the indictment against me was originally filed, and subsequently on this Court, for example the pleading placed on the case file as Annex No. 2 to this position paper: Procedural submission of the injured party filed with the District Prosecutor’s Office in Tarnów, dated 18 January 2026, together with the attached Medical Documentation, Discharge Summary from hospital treatment of 28 October 2025 — Annex No. 2.1.
Such a drive to destroy me is expressed by the German term „vertnichten”, characteristic of the Nazi”Sondergericht” — as established in the literature of the subject, for example K. Graczyk, Sondergericht Kattowitz — Special Court in Katowice 1939–1945, Warsaw 2020, p. 55; the first Nazi special courts, replacing subsumption with acts contrary to the values recognised by civilised nations, were established by the Decree of 21 March 1933, which entered into force the next day (Verordnung der Reichsregierung über die Bildung von Sondergerichten. Vom 21. März 1933, RGBl. 1933, S. 136 [Decree of the Government of the Reich on the Establishment of Special Courts of 21 March 1933]).
The Regional Court in Katowice has violated the rights guaranteed to me by the Constitution, including the prohibition on violating dignity, in particular in its decision of 9 December 2025 by failing to lift the monetary bail (PLN 500,000), knowing that during the sixteen months of pre‑trial detention, as a result of inhuman treatment (Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms), a threat to my life (Article 2 of the Convention) was created by causing me to develop a cardiac condition, which I documented, inter alia:
- with appropriate medical documentation served on the Court — coronary artery changes reaching 90% (the aforementioned Annex No. 2), which were not diagnosed when, at the beginning of pre‑trial detention, as a result of inhuman treatment in the Rzeszów Prison, I was taken to the prison hospital in Kraków,
- with the order instituting an investigation by the District Prosecutor’s Office in Tarnów,
- with numerous evidentiary motions addressed to that Prosecutor’s Office, also served on this Court.
The Regional Court in Katowice also knew that the funds from the monetary bail were necessary for my costly, life‑saving treatment, which is confirmed by concrete facts that I cited during the court sitting preceding the issuance of that decision (the Record of the Court sitting of 25 November 2025) and to which facts the Court did not respond, contrary to the standard under Articles 4 and 6 in conjunction with recital 16 of Directive 2016/343, as interpreted in the Order of the Court of Justice of 12 February 2019, RH, C‑8/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:110, paragraph 60 and the operative part, point 2 — the obligation „to state reasons for the decision not only by indicating the established circumstances, but also by ruling on the objections raised by the defence of the person concerned”.
In rejecting my motion to lift the monetary bail, the Regional Court in Katowice, following the model of a”sondergericht”, gave reasons without performing subsumption, which means an extra‑legal act, since the Court adjudicated without indicating „specific facts” that would satisfy the general precondition for the application of preventive measures and without indicating „specific evidence” to substantiate those facts. Such specific facts and evidence are required by the Strasbourg and Luxembourg case‑law and Polish case‑law that I have invoked in my procedural submissions; additionally I now point to a case in which the Court draws attention expressly to the fact that:
- it is not sufficient for the authorities to refer to „the nature of the offence, the way it had been carried out and the existing evidence”,
- instead of „the fact‑finding” based on „concrete evidence”— judgment of the ECtHR of 8 July 1999, Tanrikulu v. Turkey, application no. 23763/94, § 108.
In other words, the basis for the application of preventive measures may only be „concrete relevant facts” — see, for example, the judgment of the ECtHR of 26 July 2001, Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, application no. 33977/96, § 84 („specific indications”) and § 87 („concrete relevant facts”).
With regard to Article 92 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, following the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Katowice of 25 October 2001, II AKa 275/01, KZS 2002, No. 3, item 57 — it must be said:
„The court, when establishing the factual basis, should refer, for each finding, to the evidence on which that finding is made, and in no event may it limit itself to a general reference to all the evidence, particularly where that evidence is contradictory.”
Had the Regional Court in Katowice adhered to that thesis of the Court of Appeal in Katowice when issuing the aforementioned decision of 9 December 2025, my life would not be at risk (within the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention). In the event, there is a failure to indicate specific facts and specific evidence, in the manner characteristic of the „der totale Staat” — and of totalitarian systems in general: Give me the man and the paragraph will be found (facts are superfluous) — which I raised expressly already in the course of the investigation, for example in the record of my interview of 27 January 2025.
At first, in the statements of reasons for the orders presenting charges, not a single fact was indicated, thereby excluding my right to active defence. Such treatment of the right of defence characterises systems in which, in place of subsumption as an expression of the rule of law, a judicial crime makes itself felt — see, more broadly, W. Kulesza, Criminal liability of judges and prosecutors for judicial crime [in:] Crimes of judges and prosecutors in Poland in the years 1944–1956, eds. W. Kulesza and A. Rzepliński, Warsaw 2000, pp. 507–517.
An exemplification of the absence of facts in the proceedings conducted against me is Annex No. 3 (Statement of reasons for the order presenting charges of 2 October 2024), where, in place of the facts required by Article 313 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, only a summary listing of evidence is presented, most of which is favourable to me, and the remainder was obtained in a manner contrary to statute, mainly by breaching defence privilege and by interrogators inducing witnesses to give false testimony. Later, in the indictment, the prosecution even used evidence in the form of non‑existent records of my questioning, which also characterises the „der totale Staat”. A number of my motions addressed to the Prosecutor’s Office conducting the investigation against me were dismissed, including as regards precise specification of the acts alleged (expressed, as to the essential elements, solely in the words of the statute, e.g. the result of the frauds imputed to me cumulatively with trading in influence was defined only by statutory formulae) and as regards indicating facts; these were met with written refusals, e.g. Annex No. 4 (Response of the Prosecutor’s Office of 2 April 2025).
Annex No. 5 (Response of the Prosecutor’s Office of 28 April 2025) is also one of the many refusals by the Prosecutor’s Office formulated in reply to my call to comply with the mandatory provisions contained in Article 313 of the Criminal Code; additionally, the Prosecutor’s Office relied on court orders on the application and extension of pre‑trial detention against me, but those judicial decisions are either blanket or indicate facts derived from non‑existent evidence, which, in turn, is the subject of proceedings before the Regional Prosecutor’s Office in Lublin.
Only once did the prosecutor, in the course of the investigation conducted against me, respond positively to my motion for refraining from the barbarisation of the proceedings. That was my motion to remove from the case file the records of my interviews carried out under conditions prohibited by Article 171 § 5 point 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure — the prohibition on using chemical means to induce me to self‑incrimination and to falsely incriminate third parties was breached, treating me purely as an object. The purpose of my presumed oppressors was, on the one hand, an attack on the conditions for freedom of expression, and on the other,”vernichten”. However, later, parts of the content of those records found their way into the statement of reasons for the indictment filed against me, albeit without attaching those „evidence” (records) to the indictment, i.e. in the statement of reasons for the indictment we are dealing with facts supported by evidence having a non est character; the Regional Court in Katowice learned of those facts before issuing the decision of 9 December 2025 from my procedural submissions, of which I spoke during the sitting of the Regional Court in Katowice on 3 February 2026 (record of the court sitting). Those facts, in a state governed by the rule of law, should not form part of the basis for the decision of the Regional Court in Katowice of 9 December 2025, but that is not what happened, which is also a measure of the barbarisation of these proceedings, continued after the indictment was filed with the Court.
In connection with the numerous breaches of criminal procedure during the investigation, consisting in collecting evidence in a manner contrary to statute, I refused to participate in the final familiarisation with the case‑file and sent a statement to the Prosecutor’s Office on 9 May 2025 declaring that my defence counsel could not take part in that act either (Annex No. 6: Suspect’s motion). Exactly one week later, my assertions regarding the use of unlawfully obtained evidence and regarding my inhuman treatment were fully confirmed, on the basis of Article 303 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by the Regional Court in Rzeszów issuing the aforementioned order (III Kp 23/25) setting aside the order of the Prosecutor of the District Prosecutor’s Office refusing to institute an investigation on my denunciations.
In the proceedings conducted against me, the practice of failing, during the investigation, to indicate „concrete relevant facts” supported by corresponding „concrete evidence”, after Prosecutor Edyta Lenart, is now continued by the Regional Court in Katowice. This is at the same time a near‑carbon copy of how the Sondergericht Kattowitz applied criminal procedure from 1941 until the end of the war to Poles and Jews (just as other special courts in all parts of Poland criminally occupied by the Nazi Germans). It is the procedure provided for in the Polenstrafrechtsverordnung (Decree on criminal law for Poles and Jews in the annexed eastern territories of 4 December 1941, RGBl. 1941, p. 759; link omitted).
That act, consisting of eighteen articles and containing”grossly unjust provisions concerning crimes, penalties and criminal procedure”, is classified among legal acts establishing „arbitrary measures” [Willkürmaßnahmen] — see the order of the Federal Constitutional Court of 19 February 1957, BVerfGE 6, 132 — Gestapo, marginal nos. 95 and 97. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg found the Polenstrafrechtsverordnung to be an act violating the Hague Conventions, in particular on account of exterminatory objectives pursued at the expense of criminal procedure (W. Kulesza, Crimen laesae iustitiae. Criminal liability of judges and prosecutors for judicial crimes under Nuremberg, German, Austrian and Polish law, Łódź 2013, p. 44). That act, in Chapter „2. Strafverfahren”(Articles IV to XII), provided in Article XII, first sentence, that the court and the prosecutor conduct the proceedings on the basis of German criminal procedural law „according to their own discretion” [„nach pflichtgemäßem Ermessen”], and, according to the second sentence of Article XII, may „depart from the application of the provisions of the Courts Constitution Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure where this is expedient for the rapid and resolute conduct of the proceedings”; for the rapid annihilation of the defendant.
The provisions of that act meant that:
„Courts applying the Polenstrafrechtsverordnung were de facto an extension of prosecutorial enforcement” — W. Kulesza, Criminal liability for judicial crimes of prosecutors of the Third Reich in West and East Germany,”Czasopismo Prawno‑Historyczne” 2021, 1, p. 74.
Absorption by the court of investigative unlawfulness constitutes one of the types of judicial crime in the typology presented by legal scholarship, in the absence of any legal definition of judicial crime in domestic and international law, which typology is used in recent case‑law. It is apt to say that, by issuing the decision of 9 December 2025, the Regional Court in Katowice adjudicated „on the basis of false evidence produced in the investigation, which it did not verify, treating it as a purely formal justification of the decision” — to use the words of the Supreme Court’s case‑law, e.g. Resolution of the Supreme Court of 8 April 2022, I DI 52/21, citing scholarly work on the typology of judicial crime: W. Kulesza, Criminal liability of judges and prosecutors for judicial crime [in:] Crimes of judges and prosecutors in Poland in the years 1944–1956, eds. W. Kulesza and A. Rzepliński, Warsaw 2000, pp. 507–517.
Another type of judicial crime distinguished in that Resolution of the Supreme Court, with reference to the same scholarly source, and likewise applicable to the aforementioned decision of the Regional Court in Katowice, is the following: „A conviction becomes a judicial crime also when it has been handed down in proceedings in which the accused was deprived of his basic human rights, being subjected, during the investigation, to cruel and inhuman treatment or being prevented from exercising the right of defence.”
In my case, instead of the disjunction „or” in the Supreme Court’s case‑law quoted above, we have a conjunction; and procedural standards required of judgments are to be applied mutatis mutandis to interlocutory decisions, on the basis of again consolidated Supreme Court case‑law requiring, in turn, that interlocutory decisions, in particular on preventive measures, must, as in every ruling, indicate specific facts and specific evidence, and if the elements of the imputed acts are expressed — as in my case — solely in statutory terms, then there are likewise no grounds for the application of preventive measures; see, for example, Order of the Supreme Court of 15 October 1996, II KZ 78/96, approved at textbook level, e.g. Criminal Procedure, ed. D. Świecki, 2nd ed., Warsaw 2023, p. 397 and the case‑law cited there.
I have been consistently indicating such argumentation, with reference not only to domestic case‑law but also to Luxembourg and Strasbourg case‑law, in my procedural submissions. The Regional Court in Katowice refuses in any way to address these points — this is the standard of”nach pflichtgemäßem Ermessen” under Article XII of the Polenstrafrechtsverordnung. This is a double breach of the rule‑of‑law standards contained, for example, in Articles 4 and 6 in conjunction with recitals 16 and 23 of Directive 2016/343 as interpreted in the Luxembourg case‑law, e.g. Order of the Court of Justice of 12 February 2019, RH, C‑8/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:110, paragraph 60 and operative part, point 2 — the obligation: [1] „to state reasons for the decision not only by indicating the established circumstances, [2] but also by ruling on the objections raised by the defence of the person concerned”.
The Regional Court in Katowice justifies the refusal to lift the monetary bail itself, leaving aside the aforementioned lack of facts confirming the existence of the general precondition, in a manner that is utterly absurd and directly oriented towards my biological annihilation — guided solely by the hallmark of the Sondergericht described as”vertnichten”.
„Materials gathered in the case file, including, inter alia, information on bank transfers or cash deposits, indicate that the defendant has been in control of significant financial resources” — so reasons the Regional Court in Katowice.
The point is that, when I practised as an advocate, in order to accumulate the funds necessary to settle tax obligations, I would make cash deposits at an ATM (of the bank where I had a business account for my legal practice) in PLN after first withdrawing, at the same ATM, from my EURO sub‑account (the same bank account) and exchanging EURO into PLN at the exchange office located next to the ATM — and in the same way I made bank transfers from one sub‑account to another — which I explained only in an evidentiary motion of 17 July 2025 sent from prison, because during numerous interviews I was not asked about it; inter alia, for sending that motion I was beaten by an officer of the Prison Service of the Rzeszów Prison in a room with a one‑way mirror, of which I informed this Court before it issued the decision of 9 December 2025.
The Regional Court in Katowice did not address at all this part of my argumentation concerning the lawful saving of money on the currency exchange rate (exchange differences) and my inhuman treatment during the investigation, which is an expression of arbitrariness in the application of law, in particular Article 92 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Articles 4 and 6 in conjunction with recitals 16 and 23 of Directive 2016/343, again on the basis of „nach pflichtgemäßem Ermessen” under Article XII of the Polenstrafrechtsverordnung.
In a word, it is solely because I once lawfully saved money on currency exchange that I am now, through the Regional Court in Katowice, exposed to the loss of life within the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention.
Thus far, the proceedings in my case before the Regional Court in Katowice, manifested inter alia in the decision of 9 December 2025, constitute an expression of the barbarisation of criminal procedure in casu to a defined extent and as such, in the following twofold perspective, recall the proceedings before the Sondergericht Kattowitz operating during the Second World War in the same building (Andreasstrasse 16/18):
As regards the annihilatory purpose.
As regards the summary character of the proceedings.
AD 1.
The proceedings of the Sondergericht Kattowitz were aimed at the biological annihilation of the defendant, carried out in accelerated and completely discretionary proceedings. The Regulation on the extension of the jurisdiction of special courts of 20 November 1938 (Verordnung über die Erweiterung der Zuständigkeit der Sondergerichte), later used for the expansion of the Nazi German judiciary into the criminally seized Polish territories, provided in Article I that the prosecutor, at his own discretion, decides which case to refer to summary proceedings before a special court — this made German criminal procedure „rapid and merciless” (J. Kepler, Sondergerichtsbarkeit und Sonderstrafrecht im Nationalsozialismus, Linz, 2023, p. 17; cf. K. Graczyk, Sondergericht Kattowitz — Special Court in Katowice 1939–1945, Warsaw 2020, pp. 47–48).
„Gnadenlos” — „merciless, severe, ruthless, […] [punish] mercilessly […]” — Great German‑Polish Dictionary, PWN, ed. J. Wiktorowicz et al., Warsaw 2010, p. 413.
At that time Roland Freisler, later President of the extra‑constitutional People’s Court (Volksgerichtshof), then a high‑ranking official in the Ministry of Justice, summed up those aims in the words: „Punishment must strike the offender with the speed of lightning”, asserting that the nation could defend itself against the enemies of the system only through „swift action and, if necessary, the annihilation of the offender” [„schlagartiges Zupacken und wenn nötig, Vernichten des Verbrechers”] — R. Freisler, Blitzartig muss die Strafe den Verbrecher treffen!,”Deutsche Justiz” 1938, 100, p. 1859 et seq.; cf. U. Eisenhardt, A. Amend‑Traut, deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Die Entwicklung einer Rechtsordnung in Europa, Munich 2024, chapter „Law and justice under National Socialist rule (1933 to 1945)”, p. 435 et seq., and literature cited there, in particular note 155.
„Vernichten” — the word used in 1938 in the publication by the future President of the People’s Court — is key, as it conveys the essence of the German system of summary courts established alongside the ordinary judiciary.
According to dictionaries:
„to exterminate […] [e.g.] pests, weeds […]” — Great German‑Polish Dictionary, PWN, ed. J. Wiktorowicz et al., Warsaw 2010, p. 1044, entry „vertnichten”;
„to destroy […], to annihilate” — A. Kilian, A. Kilian, Dictionary of legal and economic language, German‑Polish, Warsaw 2009, p. 718, entry „vertnichten”;
„destruction, extermination, annihilation, extermination […]” — J. Chondera et al., Pocket German‑Polish Dictionary, ed. J. Czochralski, 18th ed., Warsaw 2003, p. 1054, entry „Vernichtung”;
„destruction, […] annihilation [e.g.] of the mentally ill” — Dictionary of legal and economic terminology German‑Polish, W. Skibicki, 5th ed., Warsaw 2000, p. 466, entry „Vernichtung”.
As noted in the literature:
K. Ambos, Nationalsozialistisches Strafrecht. Kontinuität und Radikalisierung, Baden‑Baden 2019, p. 45 (and literature cited in notes 165–170): „The concept of criminal law according to R. Freisler also had a general preventive character. Its aim — as a 'reflection of the National Socialist German world view’ — was the continuous self‑purification of the national organism […], in order to annihilate [’vernichten’] 'the type of disturber of peace in the nation’, i.e. the one who threatens the nation from within.”
J.F. Lindner, Rechtswissenschaft als Metaphysik, Tübingen 2017, p. 181: Nazi law was „a metaphysical law, burdened with extra‑legal ideologies [’außerrechtliche Substanzideologien’], which asserted themselves in an inhuman and annihilatory manner [’menschenverachtenden und ‑vernichtenden’] […].”
P.L. Kalmbach, Das System der NS‑Sondergerichtsbarkeiten, „Kritische Justiz” 2017, 2, pp. 228–229 (and literature cited in note 13 and documents cited in note 23): „This change was equally important for today’s understanding of the special courts, their considerable expansion, both in terms of numbers and jurisdiction, in subsequent years, 1939/40.”
In the criminally occupied Polish territories, special courts spread rapidly (K. Wille, Drei Jahre Aufbauarbeit in der Justiz des Generalgouvernements, „Deutsches Recht” 1942, p. 1425). Special courts in Poland „were considered to be exemplary in the German system of justice because of their mercilessness [’Unbarmherzigkeit’] and were therefore to serve as a testing ground for young judges” (P.L. Kalmbach, Das System der NS‑Sondergerichtsbarkeiten,”Kritische Justiz” 2017, 2, p. 232 and literature cited in note 51; A. Tautphaeus, Der Richter im Wartheland [Judge in the Wartheland], „Deutsches Recht” 1941, p. 2468).
The word „Unbarmherzigkeit” means:
„lack of pity […], mercilessness” — J. Chondera et al., Pocket German‑Polish Dictionary, ed. J. Czochralski, 18th ed., Warsaw 2003, p. 998, entry „Unbarmherzigkeit”;
„[…] merciless” — U. Czerska et al., Pocket German‑Polish and Polish‑German Dictionary, Poznań 2001, p. 421, entry „unbarmherzig”;
„[…] merciless [fight] […]” — Great German‑Polish Dictionary, PWN, ed. J. Wiktorowicz et al., Warsaw 2010, p. 985, entry „unbarmherzig”.
The day after the fire in parliament on 27 February 1933 a regulation (Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten zum Schutz von Volk und Staat von 28. Februar 1933) was issued restricting a number of „fundamental rights” provided for by the Weimar Constitution, including that „violations of the secrecy of post, correspondence and telephone are permissible” […]. From that moment, searches of dwellings, opening of letters and telephone eavesdropping became permissible without limitation. […] All kinds of inviolability of the dwelling, property and secrecy of correspondence became permissible without any […] restrictions […] — as emphasised by S. Glaser (Reform of criminal law in Germany, „Gazeta Sądowa Warszawska”1934, 30–31, pp. 457, 458 and 459), adding that this took place within the framework of the „der totale Staat”(p. 459), and that the primary aim of the reform of criminal law towards a totalitarian state was, broadly speaking, „the absolute precedence of the interest of the state over the interest of the individual” (p. 456).
Taken together, this yielded a ” criminal law” („’totales’Strafrecht”) (K. Ambos, Nationalsozialistisches Strafrecht. Kontinuität und Radikalisierung, Baden‑Baden 2019, subsection II.2. „Material concept of wrong, ethicisation,’total’ criminal law and de‑formalisation, p. 38 et seq.).
All these violations of „fundamental rights” were perpetrated against me during the investigation conducted by the Out‑stationed Division of the National Public Prosecutor’s Office in Rzeszów, of which the Regional Court in Katowice, when issuing the decision of 9 December 2025, was aware (also under Article 92 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) from my numerous procedural submissions, to which it did not in any way refer in that decision, although from the point of view of the rule of law the proceedings against me, considered as a whole, lost their legal raison d’être at the very moment these violations were committed. That Court, again on the basis of „nach pflichtgemäßem Ermessen” and”außerrechtliche Substanzideologien”, departed from the application of Polish criminal procedural provisions pointing to the necessity of performing subsumption when issuing any ruling (e.g. Article 92 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), including when issuing a decision on preventive measures, as well as departed from the application of a number of provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Article 6(3)(a)), and of European Union law (e.g. Article 6(1) and (3) of Directive 2012/13/EU), corresponding to the provisions of national criminal procedure law, indicated in my numerous procedural submissions supported by Strasbourg and Luxembourg case‑law, filed in the case. In order further to demonstrate, beyond the submissions already filed, that the Regional Court in Katowice behaved like the Sondergericht Kattowitz with regard to „permissible violations of the secrecy of post, correspondence and telephone”, I submit, as Annex No. 7, a Notice of suspicion of commission of an offence by Prosecutor Daniel Lerman and by the President of the Regional Court in Warsaw, dated 3 February 2026, together with two annexes: Letter sent to the Prime Minister, dated 26 May 2025 — Annex No. 7.1; Letter addressed to the President of the Regional Court in Warsaw of 16 July 2025, sent by me from the Rzeszów Prison — Annex No. 7.2.
Furthermore, the Regional Court in Katowice was aware (under Article 92 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) of the violations of freedom of communication with defence counsel indicated in Annexes Nos. 7.1 and 7.2 during the period of my pre‑trial detention, from reading the case file, since, leaving aside my procedural submissions lodged with the Regional Court in Katowice, the aforementioned letter addressed to the President of the Regional Court in Warsaw of 16 May 2025 is included in the case file.
The essence of these violations, which took place at the Rzeszów Prison, consisted in the unauthorised intrusion by Prison Service officers into my freedom to communicate with defence counsel. This consisted, in particular, in:
eavesdropping on telephone conversations with defence counsel (audio monitoring);
failure to deliver to defence counsel, Advocate Janusz Kaczmarek, a registered letter bearing on the envelope the note „defence privilege”, received from me by a Prison Service officer — the letter of the Directorate of the Rzeszów Prison of 25 April 2025 entitled „Report on explanatory actions …”, contained in the case file, confirms three instances of such registered letters, of which the fate is unknown, although it is known that a Prison Service officer received those letters from me.
The factual circumstances described above, according to the consolidated case‑law of the Polish Supreme Court in a democratic state governed by the rule of law, in themselves constitute a ground of appeal on account of a breach of defence privilege, for example:
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 4 March 2004, IV KK 347/03: „a breach of the right of defence is, by its very nature, a defect affecting the content of the decision, save where the appeal filed on behalf of the convicted person is allowed in full”;
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 8 December 2003, V KK 107/03: „The appellate court could make findings on the factual conditions of communication of the accused deprived of liberty with defence counsel during her stay in the remand centre precisely in the appellate proceedings, since the plea of restriction of the accused’s unrestrained contact with defence counsel was raised only in the appeal. Making these findings was of material importance for the substantive determination of the plea of breach, in the adjudicatory proceedings, of the standards of the right of defence defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure (Articles 6 and 73 § 1) and in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Article 6(3)(b) and (c)). Only after making those findings could the appellate court properly assess the plea raised in the appeal. By failing to meet these requirements, the Regional Court grossly breached procedural law, and that breach could have had a material effect on the content of its decision”;
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 6 November 2002, II KKN 87/01: „a breach of the right of defence is, by its very nature, a defect affecting the content of the decision, save where the appeal filed on behalf of the accused is allowed in full.”
Already for the sole reason of the breach of „unrestrained contact with defence counsel”, this is causa finita, i.e. any decision of the Regional Court in Katowice adverse to me lacks legal raison d’être. That Court refuses to acknowledge the essence of defence privilege conveyed at least in the three judgments cited above, which rely on European and domestic provisions. To the question cui bono, the answer is „vernichten”, with the addition of the specific feature of the Sondergerichte operating in the criminally occupied Polish territories —”Unbarmherzigkeit”.
AD 2.
Proceedings before the Nazi German special courts (Sondergerichte) were by design „summary”, which is also what confronts me before the Regional Court in Katowice and from the very commencement of the investigation conducted against me, which concluded with the filing of the indictment with that Court, although from the rule‑of‑law perspective it is contra legem. In my procedural submissions to the Court (previously in my interlocutory appeals against the imposition and extension of pre‑trial detention), drawing on Strasbourg and Luxembourg case‑law, I call this legally inadmissible „blanketness”, consisting in replacing „concrete relevant facts”, which should be correlated with „concrete evidence”, with a summary „state of the evidence”. Against such „summary”proceedings under current Polish criminal procedure, the doctrine and the case‑law I have cited in my submissions filed with the Regional Court in Katowice also warn expressly, for example:
„The court has the duty to present descriptively the material facts and circumstances and, for each finding, to cite the evidence on which that finding is made (see judgment of the Court of Appeal in Katowice of 30 November 2007, II AKa 103/07, KZS 2008, No. 4, item 103); the summary (global) listing of evidence […] is considered a breach of procedural law […]” — Code of Criminal Procedure. Commentary, ed. J. Skorupka, 7th ed., Warsaw 2026, art. 424, thesis V.1; emphasis in the original.
Under the conditions of the Nazi special courts, „summary character” was associated, for example, with „depriving the parties of influence over the scope of the evidentiary proceedings” (thus about the proceedings before the German special courts established already in preparation for the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe, including the establishment of such courts in the Polish territories criminally seized by Germany: S. Glaser, Reform of criminal law in Germany, „Gazeta Sądowa Warszawska”1934, 30–31, p. 459). This „summary character” was magnified by the fact that the evidentiary proceedings were not subject to verification, since „the questions of the interviewer were usually not recorded” (K. Graczyk, Sondergericht Kattowitz — Special Court in Katowice 1939–1945, Warsaw 2020, p. 165). I was repeatedly interviewed in that manner by Prosecutor Edyta Lenart, who, in unrecorded questions — questions with a thesis — attempted to induce me to confess to something I had not done and to baselessly incriminate third parties. Not only in connection with my being interviewed under conditions excluding the freedom of my expression through the use of chemical substances, but also in connection with unrecorded questions, I repeatedly lodged written motions with the Prosecutor’s Office during the investigation for audio‑recording of witness interviews and of my interviews, which were each time met with a written refusal by the Prosecutor’s Office. An audio recording could have captured my altered voice under the influence of substances referred to in Article 171 § 5 point 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As the doctrine emphasises, referring to consistent case‑law:
„It was also rightly held in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Katowice of 26 February 1998 (II AKa 318/97, Biul. Inf. Pr. 1999, No. 1, p. 24) that the requirements of Article 171 of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning the conditions of giving explanations, testimony and statements cannot be related exclusively to events that occurred at the time they were given, nor can they be linked to the conduct only of the person conducting the interview. This applies in particular to unlawful means of coercion (intimidation), the use of which, even long before the interview, by its nature can always have an effect on the person being interviewed in a manner excluding the freedom of expression. It is also obvious that any doubts in this respect cannot be interpreted to the detriment of the accused. Moreover, if the court harbours doubts as to the occurrence of the above, it is obliged to establish the circumstances preceding and accompanying the interview, and then to assess whether, in view of Article 171 § 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, those explanations may constitute evidence in the case (judgment of the Court of Appeal in Gdańsk of 22 June 2016, II AKa 150/16, KZS 2016, No. 12, item 76)” — Code of Criminal Procedure. Commentary, ed. J. Skorupka, 7th ed., Warsaw 2026, commentary on Article 171, marginal no. 15; emphases in the original.
Importantly, a record of interview without the recorded questions does not lend itself to control as to the reliability of the interview (against which, under the currently applicable Polish criminal procedure, Article 148 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the doctrine also warns, citing the case‑law, for example: Code of Criminal Procedure. Commentary, ed. J. Zagrodnik, Warsaw 2024, commentary on Article 148, thesis no. 2), including that such a record is inherently not amenable to control for suggestive questions and for the exclusion of freedom of expression — that is, first.
Second, in the Nazi special courts, no appellate control was provided („The judgment could not be challenged by an ordinary remedy” — K. Graczyk, Sondergericht Kattowitz — Special Court in Katowice 1939–1945, Warsaw 2020, p. 60); Article VI(1), first sentence, of the Polenstrafrechtsverordnung expressly provided: „Every judgment is subject to immediate execution”; whereas, under paragraph 2, the right to a remedy was granted exclusively to the prosecutor.
By contrast, the decision of the Regional Court in Katowice, since it fails to contain specific facts satisfying the general precondition for the application of preventive measures and fails to indicate specific evidence to substantiate those facts, according to the consistent view of the case‑law of the Supreme Court, cited in a number of my procedural submissions filed with the Regional Court in Katowice, does not lend itself to appellate review. I raised the same ground of complaint from the very beginning of the investigation conducted against me, already in the complaint against the decision imposing pre‑trial detention (Annex No. 8: Complaint of the suspect of 26 April 2024), but it was to no avail, since the Court, instead of subsumption, performed an extra‑legal act, on the aforementioned basis described as „außerrechtliche Substanzideologien”. Now, guided by the same purpose in the Regional Court in Katowice, in the VI Division, steps have been taken, based on a falsehood, to deprive me of the right to file that complaint, per saldo modelled on the Sondergericht Kattowitz.
Sondergericht Kattowitz = „vernichten” + „nach pflichtgemäßem Ermessen” + „Unbarmherzigkeit”.
Such „law” (non‑law) was applied to me first during the investigation, and currently before the Regional Court in Katowice. The very „nach pflichtgemäßem Ermessen”means a breach of Article 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997, sanctioned by Article 231 of the Criminal Code. Meanwhile, „blanketness” — established on the tertium non datur basis — carried out on the basis of „Give me the man and the paragraph will be found” — automatically indicates that we are not dealing with subsumption, i.e. there was no act of applying the law at all, which in turn inevitably took place on the basis of”außerrechtliche Substanzideologien”.
To date, during the investigation conducted against me and the proceedings before the Regional Court in Katowice, in my procedural submissions to evidence the thesis of procedural unlawfulness I have consistently adduced domestic, Strasbourg and Luxembourg case‑law, but the response has been only an intensification of procedural unlawfulness by the Regional Court in Katowice, and so I have now discussed the jurisprudence of Nazi Germany and related it to the conduct of my case by the Regional Court in Katowice.
Waldemar Gontarski
Enclosures:
Annex No. 1: Interview for the weekly „Angora” of 15 December 2024.
Annex No. 2: Procedural submission of the injured party filed with the District Prosecutor’s Office in Tarnów, dated 18 January 2025, together with attached Medical Documentation, Discharge Summary from hospital treatment of 28 October 2025 — Annex No. 2.1.
Annex No. 3: Statement of reasons for the order presenting charges of 2 October 2024.
Annex No. 4: Response of the Prosecutor’s Office of 2 April 2025.
Annex No. 5: Response of the Prosecutor’s Office of 28 April 2025.
Annex No. 6: Suspect’s motion, dated 9 May 2025.
Annex No. 7: Notice of suspicion of commission of an offence by Prosecutor Daniel Lerman and by the President of the Regional Court in Warsaw, dated 3 February 2026, together with two annexes: 7.1. Letter sent to the Prime Minister, dated 26 May 2025; 7.2. Letter addressed to the President of the Regional Court in Warsaw of 16 July 2025, sent by me from the Rzeszów Prison.
Annex No. 8: Complaint of the suspect of 26 April 2024.